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Gender and Performance: Evidence from School Assignment
by Randomized Lottery
By JUSTINE S. HASTINGS, THOMAS J. KANE, AND DOUGLAS O. STAIGER*
School choice programs are intended to im-
prove student achievement, by allowing for bet-
ter matches between students and schools. It is
not clear, however, that academic achievement
will improve if parents make school choice de-
cisions over both academic and nonacademic
school attributes (Justine S. Hastings et al.,
2005, 2006). Indeed, many randomized studies
of impacts of school choice find little or no
effect of school choice on academic outcomes.
For example, initial evaluations of randomized
voucher experiments in Milwaukee and New
York City found modest academic impacts on
eligible students (John F. Witte et al., 1995;
Daniel P. Mayer et al., 2002).1 More recently,
evaluations of public school choice lotteries in
Chicago and Charlotte have found no difference
between the average lottery winner and loser in
academic outcomes such as test scores (Julie
Cullen et al., 2003; Hastings et al., 2006). When
parents are choosing schools for academic and
nonacademic reasons, school choice may in-
crease utility but not necessarily improve aca-
demic outcomes.
There is growing evidence that educational
interventions may have heterogeneous treat-
ment effects by gender. Analysis of the Moving
To Opportunity demonstration, in which parents
were randomly given the opportunity to move
to nonpoverty neighborhoods, found improve-
ments in education, mental health, and criminal
behavior for females, but negative effects on
males (Jeffrey R. Kling and Jeffrey B. Liebman,
2004). Similarly, Michael Anderson (2005) re-
analyzed data from three randomized trials of
early childhood education and found that all of
the long-term benefits accrued to girls and not to
boys.
We use data from a public school choice
program, with school assignment by lottery, to
estimate the impacts on academic outcomes by
race and gender of attending a first-choice
school. Our data come from the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg school district (CMS) in North
Carolina, which introduced district-wide public
school choice in the fall of 2002 after a race-
based busing plan was terminated by the courts.
The data include students’ choices, lottery num-
bers, school assignments, demographics, and
academic achievement for the years surround-
ing implementation of school choice.
We compare outcomes for those making sim-
ilar choices, whose school assignment was de-
termined solely by lottery number. Overall,
there was no gain in academic achievement for
those winning the lottery. White females did
experience significant improvements in test
scores when randomized into their first choice
school, however. White females were also more
likely to choose academically focused magnets
and, among those who won the lottery, reported
significant increases in time spent on home-
work. Our evidence suggests that school choice
programs may have heterogeneous treatment
effects by gender, which are related to differ-
ences in the factors driving parental choices.
I. The CMS Choice Plan
Prior to the fall of 2002, CMS operated under
a racial desegregation order for three decades.
In September 2001, the district was declared
“unitary” by the courts and ordered to dismantle
the race-based student assignment. The school
board subsequently voted to approve a district-
wide public school choice plan. In the spring of
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1 Subsequent analyses of those programs accounting for
attrition found no impacts (Cecilia Rouse, 1998; Alan B.
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2002, parents were asked to submit their top
three choices of school programs for each child.
Each student was assigned a nearby “home
school” and was guaranteed admission to this
school if she was not admitted to any of her top
three choices. Admission to nonguaranteed
schools was determined by lottery.
Our analysis focuses on students whose admis-
sion to their first-choice school was determined
solely by lottery number. Since those listing their
home school first were guaranteed admission, we
dropped these observations.2 Remaining students
were assigned to priority groups, and admission
within priority group was determined by a random
number. The priority groups were:
● Priority 1: Student attended the school in the
prior year.
● Priority 2: Free-lunch eligible student apply-
ing to school where less than half the students
were free-lunch eligible.
● Priority 3: Student applying to a school
within her geographic choice zone.3
Slots were first assigned to those in the home
school zone listing their home school first. The
remaining slots were then assigned by priority
group and lottery number.4 If a school was not
filled by those who listed it as a first choice, the
lottery process repeated with those listing the
school as a second choice, using the same priority
groups as above. For most schools, seats were
filled by the time the second choices came up.5
II. Data
We began with the choice forms submitted by
105,706 students. We dropped students with
special needs, those admitted due to siblings,
those who listed a guaranteed school first, and
those who belonged to a priority group for
which 100 percent of students in that group
were either admitted or denied admission to the
chosen school. We were left with 6,931 students
in “marginal priority groups,” that is, those pri-
ority groups within the school/grade choices
where admission was determined by random
number alone.
We had administrative data on demographics,
school attended, absences, suspensions, and
grade retention for both the 2001–2002 (base-
line) and 2002–2003 school years. North Caro-
lina End of Grade reading scores were available
for students in grades three through nine and
math scores for students in grades three through
eight. We standardized the test scores by grade
level and year to have mean zero and a standard
deviation of one, and averaged the math and
reading score to create a composite test score. In
addition, the testing data in North Carolina also
included student self-reports on the number of
hours spent on homework each week.
III. Results
There were substantial differences by race
and gender in both baseline academic perfor-
mance and in the schools chosen, with white
females having the highest baseline test scores
and choosing more academic-oriented schools.
Table 1 describes the characteristics of the ran-
domized group. Overall, these students were
less likely to be white than students in the
district as a whole (44 percent white), reflecting
the higher fraction of white students who listed
their home school first.6 White students had
higher baseline test scores than nonwhites, were
less likely to receive lunch subsidies, had lower
suspension rates, and were assigned to higher-
scoring home schools. In addition, white stu-
dents, and white females in particular, tended to
choose higher-scoring schools, were more
likely to choose academic-oriented magnet pro-
grams (International Baccalaureate, Learning
Immersion), and were less likely to choose non-
academic magnets.
2 See Hastings et al. (2005) for a detailed description of
the student choice data.
3 The county was split into four geographic Choice
Zones. A student could choose any school; however, busing
would be provided only within the student’s Choice Zone.
4 The random number was assigned using a computer
algorithm that we verified with CMS programmers. Parents
do not know their lottery numbers at the time of submitting
their choices. Once any sibling was admitted to a school,
other siblings could choose to attend the school. We
dropped those who were admitted to a school because of a
sibling preference.
5 See Hastings et al. (2005) for a discussion of potential
strategy in school choices.
6 See Hastings et al. (2005) for a detailed discussion of
student choices.
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Table 2 reports the difference in baseline
characteristics between lottery winners and los-
ers, controlling for lottery fixed effects, as a
validity check of the randomization. There were
no significant differences in baseline character-
istics between lottery winners and losers over-
all. There were some differences that were
significant at the 5-percent level once the data
were broken down by gender and race, but the
point estimates were small in magnitude, not
jointly significant, and did not display any ob-
vious pattern.
Table 3 reports the estimated impact of win-
ning the lottery on the characteristics of the
school attended and academic outcomes. Each
estimate is from a separate OLS regression that
controls for student baseline characteristics (Xi)
and choice-grade (lottery) fixed effects (j),
based on the following equation:
Yij  Xi  WonLotteryij  j  ij .
The first row of estimates shows that differ-
ential attrition of lottery winners was small and
insignificant. Among all students, lottery win-
ners were 1.4 percentage points less likely to
leave the district by the fall of 2002 with a
standard error of 0.9. The second through fifth
rows of estimates show that winning the lottery
did have a significant effect on the school that a
TABLE 2—DIFFERENCE IN BASELINE CHARACTERISTICS BETWEEN LOTTERY WINNERS AND LOSERS
Variable
All
students
White
female
White
male
Nonwhite
female
Nonwhite
male
Students’ baseline performance
Test score 0.010 0.003 0.018 0.085* 0.054
(0.026) (0.047) (0.067) (0.037) (0.055)
Absent  18 days 0.011 0.024 0.013 0.002 0.034*
(0.010) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.014)
Suspended 0.010 0.005 0.012 0.010 0.021
(0.009) (0.012) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018)
Home school characteristics
Average test scores 0.019 0.044* 0.041* 0.032 0.012
(0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016)
Notes: The differences are regression estimates controlling for lottery fixed effects. Standard errors adjust for clustering by
first-choice school. Significance indicated by * (p  0.05), ** (p  0.01), and *** (p  0.001).
TABLE 1—CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDENTS IN LOTTERY BY GENDER AND RACE
Variable
All
students
White
female
White
male
Nonwhite
female
Nonwhite
male
Student demographics
White 34.8% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Female 50.1% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
Free or reduced lunch 39.4% 9.2% 8.8% 58.6% 52.4%
Students’ baseline performance
Test score 0.122 0.473 0.371 0.318 0.444
Absent  18 days 12.4% 9.7% 9.8% 13.2% 14.5%
Suspended 15.2% 3.2% 9.7% 14.6% 25.1%
Choice school characteristics
Average test scores 0.045 0.264 0.199 0.051 0.056
Academic magnet 9.9% 16.1% 12.7% 8.5% 6.7%
Nonacademic magnet 45.8% 24.9% 32.0% 54.7% 55.2%
Home school characteristics
Average test scores 0.224 0.013 0.012 0.356 0.331
N 6,739 1,114 1,233 2,265 2,127
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student attended in the subsequent year. Lottery
winners were 52 percentage points more likely
to attend their first-choice school and attended
schools with average test scores about one-tenth
of a standard deviation higher. Lottery winners
were significantly more likely to attend a non-
academic magnet, but this effect was weakest
for white females. In contrast, winning the lot-
tery had the largest effect on attending an aca-
demic magnet school for white females.
Overall, we find some impacts of winning the
lottery on outcomes other than test scores. For
example, lottery winners were more likely to
report doing more than three hours of home-
work (4.4 percent, base of 30 percent), less
likely to have five or more unexcused absences
(3.8 percent, base of 34 percent), and less likely
to have been retained (1.5 percent, base of 3.9
percent). There was no impact overall on any of
the test score measures, however.
As reported in columns 2 through 5, the
overall impacts mask important differences
by gender and race. The results for white
females are strikingly different from the other
groups. White females experience significant
gains in test scores as a result of winning the
lottery. If anything, winning the lottery ap-
pears to have a negative effect on test scores
for all other subgroups.
The differing impacts reflected important
differences in choices. White girls seemed to
choose slightly better schools than their male
counterparts and were the most likely to
choose academically challenging magnets. In
addition, the increase in the self-reported
fraction of students doing more than three
hours of homework per week is driven com-
pletely by the white female subcategory. They
experience a roughly 50-percent increase in
homework. These results suggest that white
females chose academically focused schools,
expended more effort on academics when ran-
domized into those schools, and experienced
significant gains in test scores as a result.
TABLE 3—IMPACT OF WINNING THE SCHOOL-CHOICE LOTTERY
Student outcome
All
students
White
female
White
male
Nonwhite
female
Nonwhite
male
Attrition
Not in district, fall 2002 0.014 0.023 0.038 0.015 0.003
(0.009) (0.022) (0.027) (0.014) (0.012)
Characteristics of school attended
First-choice school 0.521*** 0.452*** 0.534*** 0.512*** 0.577***
(0.036) (0.048) (0.038) (0.047) (0.050)
Average test scores 0.099*** 0.108** 0.075 0.114*** 0.106**
(0.026) (0.036) (0.039) (0.030) (0.035)
Academic magnet 0.020 0.079 0.013 0.014 0.016
(0.020) (0.044) (0.021) (0.023) (0.019)
Nonacademic magnet 0.211*** 0.119* 0.181*** 0.243*** 0.240***
(0.042) (0.051) (0.049) (0.048) (0.055)
Student performance
Test score 0.012 0.151*** 0.044 0.053* 0.042
(0.020) (0.037) (0.047) (0.026) (0.032)
3 hrs. homework/week 0.044* 0.173*** 0.021 0.002 0.041
(0.021) (0.041) (0.059) (0.028) (0.024)
Unexcused absence  5 days 0.038* 0.059 0.008 0.058* 0.027
(0.019) (0.032) (0.046) (0.023) (0.030)
Suspended 0.020 0.016 0.013 0.029 0.036
(0.011) (0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.027)
Retained 0.015* 0.010 0.017 0.007 0.017
(0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012)
Notes: Each entry is from a separate OLS regression of the given outcome on lottery outcomes. Regressions included lottery
fixed effects, baseline characteristics (race, gender, free lunch, ESL status, absences, suspensions, and retentions). The
regressions for student test scores and homework also controlled for baseline test score. Standard errors adjust for clustering
at the first-choice school level. Significance indicated by * (p  0.05), ** (p  0.01), and *** (p  0.001).
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In addition, decreases in unexcused absences
as a result of winning the lottery are driven by
decreases among females. Columns 2 and 4
show that females experienced a roughly 6-
percentage-point decline in having five or more
unexcused absences. This result is significant
only among nonwhite females, although the point
estimates are the same across white and nonwhite
females. In contrast, there are no significant ef-
fects on any of the outcomes for males.
IV. Conclusion
A number of recent evaluations of educational
interventions have reported differing impacts by
gender and race. Without a theory to account for
those differing subgroup impacts, such differences
could simply be due to chance. When we examine
choices made by students in the CMS school
choice lottery, we find evidence of heterogeneous
preferences. Different subgroups of students chose
different types of schools: white females were
more likely to choose academically rigorous mag-
nets, while nonwhite students were more likely to
choose nonacademically focused magnet options.
More generally, Hastings et al. (2005) show in a
mixed-logit demand framework that preferences
over school characteristics vary greatly across and
within race and free-lunch recipient students. Par-
ents face trade-offs between school characteristics
such as location, academics, and racial composi-
tion. Different parents place different weights on
each of these objectives. Giving parents more
choices may improve utility but may have little
effect on academic achievement overall if parents
also have nonacademic objectives.
The results presented here seem consistent
with this hypothesis. On average there is no
significant impact of school choice on student
test scores. Among white females in particular,
however, there were significant gains in test
scores as a result of winning the lottery. There is
suggestive evidence that this may be a result of
both the choices they made and personal effort.
White girls were more likely to choose aca-
demic magnet schools and were the only group
that reported significant increases in hours de-
voted to homework as a result of winning the
lottery. Perhaps both the preferences that drive
choice decisions and the reaction by students to
their lottery outcomes may determine academic
outcomes in a school-choice setting.
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